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Vivir bien governance in Bolivia: chimera or attainable utopia? 
 
 
Abstract The notion of vivir bien – a complex set of ideas, worldviews, and knowledge deriving 
from indigenous movements, activist groups, and scholars of indigeneity – has become an 
overarching principle for policy-making and state transformation processes in Andean countries. 
This article analyses the contradiction between the principle of vivir bien as an egalitarian utopian 
category and its bureaucratic application in Bolivia to state formation processes and power 
dynamics involving social movements. It argues that while discursively grounded on such 
egalitarian principles as reciprocity and rotating authority, its implementation entails bureaucratic 
propensities to centralize power and authority. Instead of decolonizing the state, it is used to 
discipline the masses. 
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On February 2016, Bolivians voted in a referendum to decide on a constitutional change that 
would allow Evo Morales, Bolivia’s first indigenous president, to stand as presidential 
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candidate for a fourth term.1 The incumbent head of state is still widely endorsed by the 
Bolivian electorate. His electoral win in January 2006 symbolized victory for a wide array of 
social movements, indigenous groups, and peasant unions and was perceived by many as the 
beginning of a new era of redefining politics more inclusively. High hopes were expressed for a 
radical, democratic, state-transformation project based on indigeneity. Conceptually grounded 
in such egalitarian principles as reciprocity and rotation of authority, the notion of vivir bien 
(living well) – a complex set of ideas, worldviews, and knowledge deriving from the diverse 
histories and experiences of indigenous movements, activist groups, and scholars of 
indigeneity – exemplifies this critical enterprise. Vivir bien became the backbone of state policy-
making. Furthermore, the constitution, approved in 2009 in a complicated and contested 
process in the Constituent Assembly and parliament, defined it as the ‘ethical-moral principle 
of the plural society’.2 One part of the democratisation project inscribed in the new 
constitution was that president and vice-president can only run for two terms; however, as 
noted, attempts to change the ruling soon appeared. Although Bolivians voted against the 
constitutional change, the relationship between the leaders’ eagerness to retain power and 
democratizing and decolonizing social movement rhetoric remains problematic. Is vivir bien 
governance a chimera or an attainable utopia? 
This article analyses the contradiction between the principle of vivir bien as an egalitarian 
utopian category and its bureaucratic application to state formation processes and power 
dynamics involving social movements. It examines whether radical democratic and decolonial 
political ideals of alternative forms of governance, or what I call ‘governing pluralities’ – that is, 
plural political formulations governing both the state and indigenous territorial arrangements – 
are being translated into bureaucratic state practices.  Or is the state apparatus, unintentionally 
perhaps, effectively taming the active agents of pluralism – social movements and indigenous 
groups – by converting them into ‘disciplined masses’? While considerable academic interest 
has developed in the concept of vivir bien / buen vivir,3 critical ethnographic examination of what 
is concretely done in its name within the state apparatus is scarce. There are many important 
ethnographic works on indigeneity and decolonization from the perspective of indigenous 
movements and communities;4 also well researched are the material conditions of state 
transformation, especially the contradictory relationship between vivir bien rhetoric and the 
extensive extractive economy.5 Yet, although ethnographies of indigeneity and questions of 
resources are crucial when examining whether state governance based on vivir bien principles is 
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a utopia, this article focuses on a less studied, yet equally critical aspect: the complexities of 
state bureaucracy, governance, and executive powers.  
The analysis is based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted between 2008 and 2009 
among Bolivian ministers, public servants, indigenous activists, and development experts 
concerning their perceptions and actions related to the notion of vivir bien as state policy.6 The 
material is complemented by critical engagement with recent policy documents7 and academic 
studies8 that connect with the subject. I argue that the governing regime’s transformational 
agenda faces severe challenges as the new indigenous policy formations collide with the 
existing bureaucratic-institutional structures of the Bolivian nation-state. These challenges are 
reflected in dual tendencies within the state: in new discursive and ideological commitments to 
decolonize it through the notion of vivir bien, and in bureaucratic propensities to centralize its 
instruments of power and authority. Recent battles over constitutional change come to light 
not as exceptions but as manifestations of the long-term functioning of power already visible 
at the time of my fieldwork.  
The following section introduces conceptual and theoretical considerations important 
when discussing policy-making, state formation, and decolonization processes, followed by 
description of the role of vivir bien as – ideally – one of democratizing and decolonizing state 
policy. The third section examines contradictory governing practices such as the corporatism 
developing in relations between the ruling regime and social movements, and the centralization 
of the state: two indications of bureaucratic and authoritarian forms of rule in stark contrast 
with discourses of democratization and decolonization which also raise possibilities for critical 
challenge to the governing regime’s agendas.  
 
 
The coloniality of Latin American state formation processes  
 
 
The term utopia is generally associated with an ideal community or society in which egalitarian 
and pluralistic principles prevail. Initiatives aiming at social transformation outside capitalism 
through local, participatory, ecological alternatives, and radical collective practices have 
become more common globally. Often termed ‘nowtopia’9 by activists and scholars, in 
distinction to the distant, futurist implications of utopia, attempts to construct concrete 
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alternative practices in the Global North include various forms of solidarity economy, co-
housing, and alternative banks, to name a few.10 The Global South hosts the circulation of 
locally rooted cultural concepts including ubuntu in Southern Africa, swaraj in India, Buddhist 
concepts elsewhere in Asia, and the notion of vivir bien, emanating from the Andes, which is 
associated with constructing new politics from below. However, what started as a complex of 
locally meaningful practices and ways of living and a political denominator in decades of 
indigenous struggles for lands and territories has now been co-opted by the Bolivian nation-
state. My question is whether and to what extent this egalitarian utopian category can be 
translated into ‘nowtopia’, concrete alternative practices in the present, within the nation-state 
structure. 
In recent decades the legitimacy of the study of the state has been challenged both in 
world politics and theoretically.11 The first challenge relates to economic globalization and the 
intensified global flows of people, capital, commodities, technology, and ideas over and across 
the borders of nation-states.12 While the state has lost a measure of regulatory capacity, the 
intensification of state-led extractive economies and the political rise of Left-wing regimes in 
Latin America indicate that further analyses are needed. In respect of the theoretical challenge, 
Foucault has redirected attention from the study of state structures and institutions to the 
wider functioning of power.13 This locates us in a different terrain to the Weberian 
neostructuralist explanations or neo-Marxist understandings of the state which were previously 
dominant within political theories of state formation despite the growing significance of 
rational-choice theory14 – all differing from Foucault’s notions which attend both to external 
state structures and internalized forms of power.15 For Foucault, power is everywhere, helping 
us to see that progressive governments and indigenous peoples also engage with it. Indigenous 
peoples are not solely passive victims of state coercion or external neoliberal oppression; 
rather, they are active agents of change with their own internal contestations, power struggles, 
and hierarchies. This understanding of power, blurring the boundaries between state and 
society, enables an examination of the role played by Bolivian social movements in state 
centres that is free of the determinist dichotomy of proletarian-run society versus perpetuation 
of a bourgeois ruling class in the guise of movement activists.  
Alongside governmentality, Foucault categorized other forms of rule: discipline and 
sovereign authority. Disciplinary institutions included prisons, state bureaucracies and other 
institutions in which people are under the constant exercise of rule. While governmentality 
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represents the productive dimension of power which aims at improving people’s wellbeing, 
discipline is about direct control, punishment, and a negative relationship of power.16 Instead 
of overseeing relations between people and things as resources for the political economy of the 
state, the state is rather associated with, and typified by, representation of the ruling regime and 
governing bureaucracies.17 Sovereignty, for its part, ‘conceives of state power in the form of a 
person (an individual or collective decision maker), whose decisions form a system of orders 
and prohibitions that direct and constrain social action’.18 However, ‘at some historical 
conjunctures a sovereign’s might is best confirmed – and secured – by ensuring the wellbeing 
of the population and augmenting its prosperity’.19 In fact, Li has argued that because of 
violent colonial histories, racial making of differences, and transnational capitalism, different 
forms of power tend to manifest themselves in awkward and contradictory articulations in the 
Global South.20 
When indigenous discourses become state policy, new conceptual tools are needed for 
their analysis. Theoretical discussions of coloniality and decolonization of the state resonate 
with Latin American decolonial thinking,21 with salient figures such as Walter Mignolo 
establishing a critical dialogue with Foucault’s thinking on power and knowledge relations.22 
Coloniality can be defined as ‘a term that encompasses the transhistoric expansion of colonial 
domination and the perpetuation of its effects in contemporary time’.23 These effects include 
‘long-standing patterns of power that…define culture, labour, intersubjective relations and 
knowledge production’.24 While colonialism as a regime of systematic political and economic 
control and violence has long since been dismantled in Latin America, coloniality, as Quijano 
suggests, is still everywhere.25 This scholarly school of thought perceives decolonial projects, 
although often emerging within modernity or at its borders, also as vehicles for confronting 
and transforming it.26 For instance, processes leading to the formulation of the notion of vivir 
bien as an alternative paradigm for state formation can be perceived in this light. According to 
Escobar, decolonization confronts two issues: first, transnational capitalism and neoliberal 
development thinking; and second, ‘discourses, practices, structures, [and] institutions…that 
have arisen over the last few hundred years out of…cultural and ontological commitments of 
European societies’.27 In the following, I describe and explain the empirical process of 





Vivir bien as decolonizing state policy  
 
 
The notion of vivir bien emerged as the backbone of Bolivian state policies with the launch of 
the National Development Plan (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo: Bolivia Digna, Soberana, Productiva, y 
Democrática para Vivir Bien, NDP) in 2006.28 While it nearly disappeared in Rumbo a una Bolivia 
Líder: 2010-2015 Programa de Gobierno – the subsequent governmental programme which gave 
priority to grand scale developmental paradigms and state-led industrialization initiatives29 – 
vivir bien has re-emerged in the 2016–2020 policy guideline (Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social 
en el Marco del Desarrollo Integral para Vivir Bien). Stated to originate from indigenous, afro-
Bolivian, and peasant ideas, worldviews, and knowledges, state policy defines vivir bien as ‘an 
alternative civilizational and cultural horizon to capitalism and modernity’.30 It draws on the 
assumed strengths of previously marginalized indigenous peoples – solidarity, collective 
wellbeing, sense of community, identity politics, and ecological knowledge and sustainability – 
as opposed to a ‘culture of individualism, mercantilism and capitalism that is based on the 
irrational exploitation of humanity and nature’.31 Vivir bien as an egalitarian utopian category is 
also present in the constitution where such conceptualizations as suma qamaña, ñandereko, teko 
kavi, ivi maraei and qhapaj ñan – often understood as the multiple indigenous origins of the 
Spanish umbrella term vivir bien – are defined as the ethical-moral principles for the Bolivian 
society.32  
Gudynas has called the state adoption of vivir bien discourse a process of domestication.33 
However, in a sense, the way in which state policy and legislation portrays vivir bien responds to 
Canessa’s remark that indigeneity can be perceived as ‘a discourse of injustice that can draw on 
positive tropes of past civilizations, a relationship to the natural environment, and a sense of 
authenticity that can speak to a broad group of Bolivians who feel dispossessed and colonized 
by powerful global economic and political forces’.34 In a policy event organized by the Vice-
Ministry of Planning and Coordination, the Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu 
(CONAMAQ) – an Andean indigenous organization which previously supported the 
governing regime but is now divided35 – defined suma qamaña as the recovery of indigenous 
self-governance over ayllus: traditional territorial units of the Aymara in the Andean 
highlands.36 Consequently, they tied the use of indigenous terminologies to their long-term 
political struggles for lands, territories, and self-governance. Historically speaking, living in 
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ayllus was based on reciprocal patterns of exchange in terms of social organization, political 
system, and the economy.37 According to Xavier Albó, a Jesuit priest and public intellectual in 
Bolivia expert in linguistics and anthropology, the notion of suma qamaña embodies numerous 
practices of reciprocity: community labour, exchange of gifts and services, the organization of 
community celebrations and rituals, and the elaborate rotational system of positions of 
authority and decision making.38 While different kinds of hierarchies have always existed in 
indigenous communities,39 the continuous rotation of authority has generally been assumed to 
level social tensions and inequalities and these principles should also be an integral part of vivir 
bien thinking at the state level.  
Indeed, the vivir bien policy framework is coupled to new perceptions of the state. The 
NDP argues that a process of decolonization of state structures, institutions, and practices is 
needed in order to eradicate characteristics of its coloniality such as ‘liberal and neoliberal 
modernization’, domination, ethnic exclusion, and racism. As an example, the NDP notes that 
the constitution of state executive powers has colonial roots, suggesting that alternatives must 
be found for such institutions.40 Social movements, indigenous peoples, and peasant unions are 
portrayed as the primary agents in restructuring political power. The plan states that the main 
goal of decolonization is to strengthen the incorporation of multiethnic and plurinational 
forms of governance and, subsequently, democratization.41 Similar claims are made in the 
2016–2020 plan, which defines the process of decolonization as the elimination of racial and 
cultural discrimination and the strengthening of indigenous knowledge and ideas. The aim of 
decolonization, it declares, is to enhance ‘the construction of communitarian socialism for 
living well’.42  
The constitution defines Bolivia as a plurinational state (Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia), 
referencing long-term indigenous struggles to recover governance of colonized lands, 
territories, and natural resources. The plurinational state, therefore, refers to a decolonized and 
decentralized state that comprises a conglomeration of various naciones (nations), autonomous 
indigenous territories, municipalities, and regions.43 According to Vice-President García Linera, 
the aim of constructing the plurinational state is to ‘allow dominated and excluded ethnic 
groups to have their share of…structures of political power’.44 The NDP, for example, 
emphasizes that the aim of the governing regime is to enhance the participation, deliberation, 
and emancipation of indigenous peoples and plural social movements both as leaders of the 
structures of state governance and within their own nations.45 Here I advance the argument 
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that the construction of the notion of vivir bien as an alternative state discourse contributes – 
ideally – to the creation of new forms of ‘governing pluralities’, that is, plural political 
formulations governing both the state and indigenous territorial arrangements. The 
democratization would – ideally – occur at these two levels. The question to which I turn next 
becomes whether, and how, social-movement regimes can implement, in practice, new, more 
democratic forms of power.    
 
 




The following sections examine whether decolonizing and democratizing political discourses 
related to new forms of governing are being translated into practice or whether the state 
bureaucracy as a disciplinary power is rather attempting to convert social movements and 
indigenous communities into what I call ‘disciplined masses’. The first two sections discuss the 
integration of social movements into state governance and, the third, the centralization of the 
state: all characteristics that demonstrate how the colonial, centralizing state bureaucracy is 
striking back against the ideals of change.   
 
Institutionalizing social movements  
 
During my fieldwork in late 2008 and early 2009, it was common to hear a social movement 
representative state that social movements were in power. Leonilda Zurita, a coca-union leader, 
former senator, and president of the Confederación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas Indígenas 
Originarias de Bolivia ‘Bartolina Sisa’ (CNMCIOB-BS) – one of the five key social movements of 
an alliance supporting President Morales – declared to me: 
 
We are part of the government; we are part of the political instrument; we are pushing this process forward with 
President Evo Morales…As our president was born…from social movements, we oblige him… As he has 





Another representative from the Confederación Sindical de Comunidades Interculturales Originarias de 
Bolivia (CSCIOB)47, the second peasant union in the alliance, agreed and stated that, in his 
opinion, the country was governed by the Bartolinas, the CSCIOB, the Confederación Sindical 
Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB), the Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de 
Bolivia (CIDOB), and the CONAMAQ. Indeed, he talked to me about the process of change in 
the first person plural: ‘we’. He declared that ‘we have been able to consolidate the process’; 
and that ‘we…are changing and transforming the country’.48 Since the mid-1990s, these three 
peasant unions and two indigenous organizations had played a role, to varying degrees, in the 
foundation and upsurge of the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) – Morales’ political party – as a 
noteworthy political contender. In 2005, they formulated a mutual cooperation agreement, the 
so-called Pacto de Unidad, with other social groups and unions to support Morales and the MAS 
in the national elections and, later, to enhance the processes of the Constituent Assembly, 
which was supposed to symbolize the first example of new, participatory, and radically 
democratic forms of decision-making.   
However, attempts have been made by the governing regime to manage social 
movements in response to increasing provocation from Morales’ own support base.49 One 
manifestation is the aim to unite social movements into a civil-society decision-making body, 
the CONALCAM (Coordinadora Nacional por el Cambio), established in 2007 to defend the 
process of change. In addition to the five social movements already mentioned, it included 
organizations such as the union of female domestic labourers, the union for retired workers, 
and the Cochabamba-based union of the users of irrigation waters. One of the leaders of the 
CSCIOB told me that the aim of the CONALCAM was to function as the nexus between 
social movements and the government in such a way that the political and economic issues of 
the country can be jointly negotiated and planned. In his opinion, it was a channel through 
which social movements could make proposals to the government on what it should do and 
how it should be done because, as he noted, ‘the CONALCAM makes the president aware of 
his errors and of the problems of the country’.50 Indeed, the CONALCAM functions in direct 
cooperation with the president and various political figures of the MAS. In this sense, social 
movements have achieved a role amidst the executive powers in influencing state policies. 
Although loosely institutionalized, the Bolivian media, for example, argued in the earlier days 
of the process that the CONALCAM has equal, or even greater, power than ministers in the 
executive.51 Indeed, this vision has been shared by the president who has expressed the view 
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that the CONALCAM should become the highest authority for making political decisions, 
even ranking above the ministerial cabinet.52  
While boundaries between state actors and movement activists are blurred, both the 
composition of the governing MAS and the establishment of the CONALCAM assign social 
movements a role in the rule of the state. Researchers have conceptualized this movement-
based regime with phrases such as ‘indigenous popular hegemony’53 and ‘state acting like 
movement’.54 Nevertheless, although the involvement of social movements in running the state 
can be considered a sign of decolonization and democratization, it is important to examine 
whether this form of institutionalization of movement actions can be seen as a way to co-opt 
and control social movements. This critical issue is examined in the following section.   
 
Corporatism as the taming of movement actions  
 
The CONALCAM has been said to function as ‘officialdom’s loyal “shock troops”’.55 One 
leader of the Bolivian Miners’ Union, for example, complained to me that the CONALCAM 
lacks independence as it is ‘a group of social organizations affined to the government’.56 As 
suggested earlier, the CONALCAM, as the coordinating body of a large number of social 
movements, has the potential to make indigenous and grassroots voices heard by the 
executive. The more dangerous implication of the institutionalization of social movements is 
that of harnessing social movements to the agendas of the governing regime and silencing 
critical political voices. There is a long history in Bolivia of perceiving indigenous populations 
as potentially dangerous and, consequently, as targets of bureaucratic control and coercion, to 
be drawn into state mechanisms through patron-client networks, corporatist arrangements, and 
other forms of co-option.57 The relationship between the executive and the CONALCAM 
somewhat resembles co-governing arrangements introduced during the 1952 nationalist 
revolution, when the most visible effect of the emerging alliance between the national 
bourgeoisie and the popular classes was ‘to institutionalize the revolution by a corporatist 
system of party control over civil society…’58 
Corporatism can be analysed from two perspectives. According to one, it ‘opens up 
institutional areas of the state to the representation of organized interests of civil society’.59 The 
other possibility is that through corporatism, the state penetrates society and establishes 
control over it; that is, there occurs ‘conquest and subordination by the state of organizations 
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of the civil society’.60 Lazar has suggested that this dual character of corporatist arrangements 
has been integral to Bolivian politics.61 On the one hand, movements, unions, and 
organizations have tended to represent a potential danger to the stability of the governing 
regime through contentious politics. Therefore, they have often been included in direct 
negotiations with it. Tapia has referred to this as an alternative form of democracy consisting 
of more than voting: it included direct participation in governmental decision-making in 
deliberative arenas that co-governing arrangements had created.62 On the other hand, 
‘collective organizations can certainly be the means by which Bolivian governments control 
their citizens’.63 This has even been recognized by some of the political leaders of MAS, with 
one of the vice-ministers, for example, complaining to me that the role of the CONALCAM 
seemed to be leaning towards caudillismo, referencing 19th-century Latin American experiences 
of authoritarian leadership. Furthermore, he implied that the aim of the CONALCAM was to 
defend governmental political goals, keeping social movements peaceful by controlling them 
from within.64   
Rightfully, the criticism has been made that rather than democratization being produced 
by indigenous ideas, power has been centralized and legitimized through the nominal 
participation of social movements. One of the technical experts at Morales’ executive 
responsible for translating vivir bien policy discourses into bureaucratic practices raised this 
contradictory role:  
 
I am confused whether this government promotes dialogue or whether it wants to impose things. The inclusion 
of social sectors, such as peasant unions and indigenous organizations, that did not participate in politics before 
makes one think that the government is interested in dialogue. On the other hand, those who do not agree with 
the government are judged to be enemies that have to be destroyed at any cost.  
 
This indicates that, alongside promoting increased movement participation, also on the agenda 
are taming and disciplining criticism, confrontation, and challenges to the governing regime.  
In addition to disciplining pro-government movements internally, there have been signs 
that social movements co-opted by the governing regime were used to suppress other civil 
society movements. In 2011, for example, when the Bolivian Workers’ Union organized strikes 
to demand higher wage increases, the governing regime ‘pitted the pro-government social 
movements of the CONALCAM, primarily the peasant unions, cocaleros and “Bartolinas”, 
against the workers’ movements’.65 Conflicts over the Isiboro Sécure Indigenous Territory and 
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National Park (Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure, TIPNIS) between the state, 
peasant unions, and indigenous groups further exemplify these tendencies.66 Plans by the 
executive to intervene in indigenous territories through large-scale development projects such 
as road building and resource extraction – forms of external penetration in which the state has 
replaced transnational agencies and corporations – were resisted by various indigenous 
organizations, while pro-government peasants’ unions and coca-growers (the group in which 
President Morales originally rose to prominence as union leader and activist) defended the 
plans. The state captured the viewpoint of what Rivera Cusicanqui calls ‘strategic ethnicity’,67 
used by peasant migrants and coca-growers to promote their political goals for lands and 
livelihoods in the name of indigeneity, in opposition to local indigenous groups’ rights to 
territories and self-governance. The executive was struggling with the unresolved tension 
between the need to improve peoples’ life conditions through development projects – 
sometimes interpreted as a pragmatic stance68 – and its commitment to respect indigenous 
territories and environmental values.  
The conflict which resulted – and which, to an extent, still continues – was, as Burman 
has suggested, a defining moment in the relation between social movements and the 
government.69 Organizations such as the CONAMAQ and the CIDOB, historically constituted 
on the basis of indigeneity, started to withdraw from alliances with peasant unions within the 
Pacto de Unidad70 – and the CONALCAM. This resulted in accentuating internal divisions in the 
CONAMAQ and the CIDOB: ongoing contestation and potential rupture in which pro-
government activists are trying to displace their more critical counterparts. Ultimately, as a 
result of the conflict, the state-led ‘hegemonic project of indigeneity was explicitly opposed by 
a heterogeneous counter-project being articulated by many different actors’.71 The TIPNIS 
conflict brought to the surface the spirit of indigenous rebellions and struggles, or what Rivera 
Cusicanqui calls ‘tactical ethnicity’72 as opposed to ‘strategic ethnicity’ – despite being opposed 
to a governing regime whose policies and legislation claim ownership over indigenous ideas.   
 
Personalization of Power  
 
Tensions have been felt within the governing regime, too. Although committed defenders of 
social movements and indigenous organizations, some ministers and vice-ministers brought up 
their own contradictory experiences within state mechanisms. The Vice-Minister of Planning 
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and Coordination, Noel Aguirre, for example, noted to me that although state discourses and 
policy ideas are new, state structures and institutions seem to retain their own logic. Aguirre 
was conscious of the contradictions when he stated: 
 
Although many of us know what is meant by the notion of vivir bien, from time to time it betrays us. Colonialism 
[colonialismo] strikes back, and starts to function in our heads and bodies… It is an eternal battle…to make a 
difference. When we are constructing the new paradigm, sometimes the old [habits] come back because they 
are easy [to implement].73  
 
In this statement, Aguirre identified previous practices with the coloniality of the state. Yet he 
also noted that the same coloniality lives on as internalized ways of being and doing in those 
who are trying to work with the new terminologies and epistemologies. MAS Member of the 
Constituent Assembly and ex-vice-Minister of Strategic Planning, Raúl Prada, mentioned that it 
was unfortunate that when the MAS entered the government, ‘it accepted the legacy of the old 
state, its ancient practices, architecture, norms, and behaviour’. Prada was particularly 
disappointed by the evolution of the Constituent Assembly, which, in his opinion, had initially 
embodied a new form of radical democracy, or ‘plurality of multitudes’, as he called it, as 
opposed to the ‘colonizing state’. The ideal of the plurinational state, as Prada suggested, was 
that radical-democratic and self-managing projects like the Constituent Assembly would 
supplant traditional state structures and institutions. Another aspect of the decentring of state 
executive powers, Prada continued, related to the enhancement of self-governing by 
autonomous indigenous nations.74 However, the Constituent Assembly failed to function due 
to contestations and power struggles both within the MAS and between the MAS and its 
political opponents, and negotiations over the restructuring of the constitution were shifted to 
the parliament. Instead of transforming the state through the logic of social movements and 
indigenous ideas, Prada concluded dejectedly that ‘the MAS had been swallowed by the state’.75 
The disciplinary boundary between the state and social movements that had been shaken by 
the rise of social movements to the corridors of state power were being re-constructed by the 
movement-based regime itself. 
Traditionally, public policy decision-making in Bolivia has been executed from top 
down, and from abroad, through the influence of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) 
and development agencies, without recognising a variety of local demands and needs.76 The 
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technical expert mentioned above, however, suggested that these traditions continue to 
operate:  
 
Because of the institutional instability, Bolivian institutions depend a lot on their leaders. Before, there was a 
clear dependency on the president and on the political power of ministers but now, as the MAS is a new 
organization that is not well consolidated, there are very few well-known figures on whom the ministries could 
rely…Therefore, decision-making on many issues falls to the president and two or three ministers that have 
political power and influence.77  
 
The implication here is that the Bolivian state is easily identified with specific political figures. 
The president is often understood as the personification of the state and national patron and 
consequently, ‘political leadership in Latin America has often tended to be authoritarian, with 
the political leader exercising a great deal of power and control’.78 The case of Evo Morales is a 
curious extension of this phenomenon as, although he is the head of the state, he rose to 
power through the social movements and peasant unions. One technical expert at the World 
Bank actually stated to me that, in his opinion, the ‘government is Evo’: ‘He has a very strong 
role in the executive,’ I was told, ‘but as the union leader, he has a lot of capacity to negotiate 
within social movements and peasant unions.’79  
Although Morales has a lot of room for manoeuvre at the intersections of state and 
society, the personalization of state power certainly contradicts the ideals of indigenous 
governance. Classical anthropological accounts have claimed that in indigenous political 
organizations authority ‘is multiple and shifting, rather than focused on a particular figure’.80 
Furthermore, they note that obligatory annual rotation of community leaders imposes ‘extreme 
limitations to power’.81 In line with this, Felix Patzi, the former Minister of Education in 
Morales’ government and current Governor of La Paz Department, suggested to me that in 
order to avoid the centralization of power, political leaders at the level of the state executive 
should rotate, as they do in ‘communitarian democracy’.82  Given that Morales and García 
Linera have tried to opt for a fourth concurrent presidential term, this is certainly not the case 
at present.  
Since a significant part of the Bolivian population voted against the Constitutional 
Reform, thus resulting in Morales’ first electoral defeat during his ten years of presidency, it 
appears that there is a call for a more democratic system with rotation of power. There are, 
however, strong voices within the social movements supporting Morales’ leadership – 
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especially in peasant unions such as the CSUTCB, the CSCIOB, and the Bartolinas – that 
argue that his symbolic leadership needs to remain intact for longer; indeed, the Bartolinas 
have recently started another political campaign to modify the constitution to favour Morales’ 
re-election.83 The justification behind this is that many social movements and grassroots 
organizations fear – quite understandably when looking at Bolivia’s turbulent history – that 
losing institutional stability would also lead into losing such state-generated initiatives as social 
reforms and indigenous autonomies that have generally been perceived as beneficial to them.    
Yet the result can also be interpreted as marking the emergence of new actors and new 
spaces which could incentivize vivir bien practices, bringing them more into line with their 
decolonizing character. Interestingly, the sectors that did not accept Constitutional Reform 
were very varied: ranging from racist, right-wing political opposition through indigenous 
populations to those who think that Morales’ regime has not sufficiently implemented Left-
wing or indigenous politics. New actors at the latter end of the spectrum included youth 
groups, Left-wing intellectuals, union leaders, and politicians and thinkers who had previously 
worked for the MAS.84 It is most likely that it also included some of the same urban ecological, 
feminist, and indigenous activists who can be identified as having aligned with indigenous 
causes during the TIPNIS conflict.85 The dynamic between the state and these diverse strands 






Using data from the operations of the Bolivian state and local social movements, this article 
has asked provocatively whether state governance according to the principles of vivir bien is a 
chimera or an attainable utopia. Response to this question is dual. On the one hand, real, 
passionate efforts are being made by social movements, indigenous organizations, various 
kinds of activists, and academic scholars to construct alternative future horizons based on 
radically decolonizing and democratizing ideas of authority and power. Consequently, the idea 
of the governed becoming governors is visible both in indigenous struggles for self-
determination and, at least discursively, in state policies. To govern in the name of vivir bien, 
therefore, signifies governing through plural political formations. The state and its governing 
16 
 
tools – policies and legislation – have become instruments of change: through policy making 
and constitutional reforms, ‘governing pluralities’ are, paradoxically, using the state as a 
channel to change how the state is governed. The nation-state that matters is a radically altered 
one of plural formations: one that is both an object and an instrument of change. 
However, the data discussed here has demonstrated that instead of instituting the 
blurring of state-society boundaries, the process of transformation has resulted in stiffening 
existing categories. Rather than being cherished as empowered subjects of change, social 
movements, indigenous groups, and radical activist networks have increasingly become targets 
of governmental discipline and control. As a result, it seems possible that the state that claims 
to function through democratizing principles is actually solidifying existing hierarchical 
governing structures, or even creating new ones. Although the institutionalization of social 
movements may enhance movement participation in state affairs, co-governing arrangements 
also function to discipline and control social movements by their co-option into state 
institutional structures. This implies the taming of radical movement politics and the 
centralization of bureaucratic power and authority. Consequently, the state apparatus is 
empowering itself to control the masses by producing and maintaining the imaginary boundary 
between the state and social forces.  
An increased degree of self-criticism and self-reflexivity is needed for any radical 
decolonizing project that tries to transcend coloniality. The re-emergence of contentious 
politics in Bolivia has showed that despite governmental attempts to co-opt it, a critical 
challenge to the repressive forms of rule is constantly present – even within, and against, a 
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